This paper builds a model of firm dynamics to study the consequences of "Limited re-entry" for macroeconomic dynamics. In the literature, exit has typically been modeled as a permanent decision whereby it is not possible for an exiting plant or firm to "re-enter" in the future. This paper relaxes this assumption by assuming that the exit decision is not permanent, but that an exiting producer still has a "limited" ability to re-enter. The model, reasonably calibrated, indicates that limited re-entry has made business cycles more volatile and persistent, and has contributed to the slow recovery following the 2007-09 recession.
INTRODUCTION
Given the well-documented heterogeneity among both plants and firms, 1 a number of recent papers have explicitly modeled the entry and exit of plants or firms for the purpose of studying macroeconomic dynamics. 2 In the literature, exit has typically been modeled as a permanent decision whereby it is not possible for the exiting plant or firm to "re-enter" in the future. This paper, however, relaxes this assumption by assuming that the exit decision is not permanent, but an exiting producer still has a "limited" ability to re-enter. By constructing a model of firm dynamics augmented to allow for re-entry, this paper studies the consequences of "limited re-entry" for the aggregate economy. The model, reasonably calibrated, indicates that "limited re-entry" has made * A previous version of this paper was circulated under the title "Entry, Exit and the Consequences for Entrepreneurship." I am grateful to Yongsung Chang, Mark Bils, Brian Peterson, Ryan Michaels and Jongsuk Han for several helpful comments and suggestions. As usual, all errors and flaws are my own.
1 For example, see Bartelsman and Doms (2000) and Henly and Sánchez (2009) . 2 For example, Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001) argue that entry and exit is an important source of aggregate productivity growth. While studying aggregate fluctuations, entry and exit have been modeled endogenously in Samaniego (2008) , Gomes and Schmid (2010) , Arellano, Bai, and Kehoe (2012) , Lee and Mukoyama (2013) , Clementi and Palazzo (2014) , and Macnamara (2014). entrepreneur. Nevertheless, the words "producer," "establishment" or "entrepreneur" may be used interchangeably when discussing the theory. While this model is closely related to Hopenhayn (1992) , two important modifications are made. First, as in Lee and Mukoyama (2013) and Clementi and Palazzo (2014) , I add aggregate technology shocks to generate cyclical fluctuations in entry and exit rates. Second, to evaluate how re-entry affects the dynamics of entry and exit, the exit decision is modified to allow for the possibility that exiting producers can re-enter at some point in the future. For the same reason, the entry decision is modified to allow potential entrants to wait until the next period to enter. Nevertheless, these last two modifications are done in a way that nests a standard model of entry and exit under certain parameters. In the following subsections, the components of the model are described in detail.
Producers
The economy is populated by a continuum of producers who are perfectly competitive and produce a single homogeneous good. Labor is the only input in the producer's production function,
, where z is aggregate productivity, s is idiosyncratic productivity and n is the labor input. It is assumed that ) 1 , 0 ( Î γ , implying that there are decreasing returns to scale at the producer level.
One way to interpret diminishing returns to scale at the producer-level is to think of the "span of control" models of Lucas (1978) and Rosen (1982) . Here a "producer" can be interpreted as consisting of an entrepreneur and n units of labor. The idiosyncratic productivity, s, can reflect heterogeneity in the skill of managers and diminishing returns to scale is a consequence of the diminishing returns of an entrepreneur in managing larger operations. However, management is not being modeled directly and entrepreneurs earn positive profits because of diminishing returns to scale. Although there are decreasing returns to scale at the producer level, there still are constant returns to scale in the aggregate because the producer can be replicated. With perfect competition, producer-level diminishing returns allow for heterogeneity to exist in equilibrium and prevents the most productive producers from taking over the market completely.
In addition to the standard idiosyncratic productivity shock, producers face an aggregate productivity shock. The processes for both shocks are assumed to be AR(1). Specifically, the productivity processes are given by
where ) , ( s z ¢ ¢ are the next-period productivity shocks and ) , ( s z ε ε are independent innovations drawn from a standard normal distribution.
Entry Decision and the Role of Delayed Entry
As in Clementi and Palazzo (2014) , I assume that a finite mass e M of prospective entrants are born every period. Each potential entrant receives a signal e s at birth about its productivity. If a potential entrant with signal e s chooses to operate today, it would immediately begin operation and its idiosyncratic productivity would be e s . A new potential entrant's initial e s is drawn from a distribution with the probability density function, ) (× n g
. Throughout this paper, I will assume that ) (× n g is the probability density function for a log normal variable with mean se a (defined below) and the standard deviation . However, in contrast to Clementi and Palazzo (2014) , I assume that a potential entrant can survive to the next period if it chooses not to enter. In particular, a potential entrant who does not enter dies with probability ] s is the potential entrant's signal. In other words, this is the value for a potential entrant if it chooses not to enter in the current period, and "wait" until the next period. These value functions are defined later in Equations (9) and (10), respectively. In making its entry decision, a potential entrant compares the value of operating it would receive if it enters against the fixed entry cost corresponds to what has been commonly assumed in the literature. In this case, an entrepreneur who chooses not to enter (1) permanently loses all information contained in its current-period signal, and (2) cannot enter in the future. In contrast, I refer to the case when 1 < θ as a situation in which "delayed entry" is possible. In other words, if a potential entrant chooses not to enter today because of poor aggregate conditions, it can "delay" or "postpone" entry until aggregate conditions improve. Furthermore, if 0 > se ρ , it retains some information about its potential productivity.
To aid the reader, it should be noted exactly how this model of entry is related to the literature. In Hopenhayn (1992) , an entrant learns the value of e s after it pays the entry cost. New producers enter the market until the expected discounted profits net of the entry cost is zero. Therefore, in such a setup, e M is endogenous. In contrast, in this paper and in Clementi and Palazzo (2014) , e M is fixed and the entrant learns the value of e s before paying the entry cost. Nevertheless, these two models can still be related using the "two-step" entry condition of Lee and Mukoyama (2013) . In Lee and Mukoyama (2013) , a potential entrant first pays an entry cost. Only after paying the entry cost does the potential entrant learn e s . As in Hopenhayn (1992) , there is free entry in stage 1 and the mass of new entrants e M is endogenous. Then, after observing e s , the potential entrant decides whether to pay an additional cost to actually enter the market. The model in this paper (and in Clementi and Palazzo, 2014) can be related to the two-step model of Lee and Mukoyama (2013) in the following way. The entry cost e c (in this paper) is equivalent to the second-stage entry cost of Lee and Mukoyama (2013) . However, suppose the first-stage entry cost is . In other words, when 0 > φ , the entry cost will tend to be higher when there are more entrants. Hopenhayn (1992) and Lee and Mukoyama (2013) essentially assume that 0 = φ , while Hopenhayn (1992) in terms of the output good. If the entrepreneur chooses to operate today, it pays the fixed cost and gets the present discounted value of profits. However, in contrast to the existing literature, I do not assume that exit is necessarily permanent for the entrepreneur.
In particular, I assume that it is possible for exiting entrepreneurs to "re-enter" in the future. More specifically, with probability
, the exiting entrepreneur dies and is never able to re-enter. Otherwise, the entrepreneur immediately becomes a potential entrant. In practice, x θ is just used to parameterize two scenarios. When 1 = x θ , re-entry is not possible at all. However, when 0 = x θ , all exiting entrepreneurs immediately become potential entrants. I will refer to the potential entrants who have previously operated as "potential re-entrants." Meanwhile, the term "potential entrants" will be used to refer to both potential re-entrants and potential entrants who have never entered.
, an exiting entrepreneur needs a signal for its productivity when it joins the pool of potential entrants. This signal is assumed to be s s e = , where s is the entrepreneur's idiosyncratic productivity when it exits. However, when 0 = se ρ , this signal will be irrelevant for the entrepreneur's signal tomorrow, e s¢ , which will determine whether the entrepreneur re-enters next period. This is the case that will be considered in the benchmark calibration. However, for robustness purposes, I consider the case when 0 > se ρ in Section 4.4.1 and find that the results are unaffected. When making the exit decision, an entrepreneur compares the value of operating with its outside option. 
, the entrepreneur's outside option is zero. This corresponds to what has been commonly assumed in the literature. In that case, the decision to exit is a highly destructive one. As with entry, (1) all information contained in the entrepreneur's idiosyncratic productivity is permanently lost, and (2) exiting entrepreneurs cannot re-enter in the future. However, when 0 = x θ and 1 < θ , the entrepreneur's outside option is greater than zero. In other words, the decision to exit is no longer completely destructive, and it is possible for the entrepreneur to re-enter in the future. Furthermore, when 0 > se ρ , an exiting entrepreneur retains some information about its potential for future productivity.
In addition, since 0 ³ e c and }
. In other words, all entrants will choose to operate. This also guarantees that exiting entrepreneurs will not have the incentive to re-enter in the same period they exit. In fact, when 0 = e c and re-entry is allowed
, it follows from Equations (4) and (5) . In this case, delayed entry is not allowed either.
Transition Rules for Entrepreneur Distributions
Given the description of the entry and exit conditions, it is now possible to define the law of motion for the distribution of entrepreneurs. Define ) (× μ to be a function over the current period's idiosyncratic shock, s. This function represents the distribution of incumbent entrepreneurs over idiosyncratic productivity at the beginning of the period before the entry and exit decisions are made. 
The function ) ( s s h ¢ is the conditional probability density function for s¢ , as determined by the process assumed in Equation (2). The first term represents the mass of incumbents who do not exit today and transition to s¢ tomorrow. Similarly, the second term represents the mass of potential entrants (including potential re-entrants) who enter today and transition to s¢ tomorrow. Analogously, given today's aggregate state x, tomorrow's distribution of potential entrants g¢ is given by 
Entrepreneur's Problem
The entrepreneur's problem can now be formulated recursively. Given the wage w, the entrepreneur's labor demand is the solution to the following static problem:
Now, let r be the risk-free rate and recall that ) , , ( g μ z x º is the vector of aggregate state variables. Let ) , ( s x V be the value of continuing for an entrepreneur with aggregate state x and idiosyncratic productivity s in the current period, after any dividends from the operations of the current period have been issued. Then,
subject to
are the transition rules defined in Equations (6) and (7) 
. If a potential entrant chooses to wait, it receives nothing today. Nevertheless, with probability ) 1 ( θ -it is able to survive to the next period. As discussed in Section 2.1.1, tomorrow the potential entrant trades off the value of entering with the value of waiting another period. 
Definition of Entry and Exit Rates
It is now possible to define entry and exit rates in the model. Let ) (x m e be the equilibrium entry rate and ) (x m x be the equilibrium exit rate. The entry rate is defined to be ) ( 
, the mass of potential entrants. In contrast, the fraction of potential entrants who enter is defined to be the entry probability:
Similarly, the exit rate is defined to be ) (
where
is the mass of exiting entrepreneurs. In contrast, Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) divide both the mass of entrants and exiting producers by the average of producers who operated today and operated yesterday. However, since entry and exit rates are small, these two measures will be approximately equal.
Labor Supply
The supply of labor is assumed to be given by the function
where w is the real wage, ν is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. 5 The parameter ψ will just be used to normalize the wage to 1 in the steady state.
Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
A recursive competitive equilibrium can then be defined as follows. A recursive competitive equilibrium consists of (i) the value functions
jointly solve the Bellman equations given by Equations (9) and (10).
2) The policy rule
is the solution to Equation (8) (4) and (5), respectively. 4) The wage ) (x w specifies the market clearing wage given aggregate state x. First, define aggregate labor demand, given x and w, as follows:
The function ) ; , ( w s z n is the solution to Equation (8). Therefore, the wage w clears the labor market when )
is the labor supply defined in Equation (14).
5) The actual transition rules,
, are given by Equations (6) and (7), implying that they are consistent with the transition rules assumed by producers.
CALIBRATION
The model can now be calibrated. The model period is a quarter. Table 1 lists the calibrated parameters. First, in Section 3.1, I discuss how I calibrate the key parameters which govern the ability of entrepreneurs to re-enter. Second, in Section 3.2, I explain how the historical technology shock is measured from the data. And finally, in Section 3.3, I review the calibration of the remaining parameters. 
Calibration of Entry Parameters
In the benchmark calibration, I allow re-entry by assuming 0 = x θ . To guide the choice of the other parameters governing re-entry, it is useful to relate the model parameters to the probability that an exiting entrepreneur will re-enter in the future. Specifically, consider the pool of surviving potential re-entrants in the steady state of the model at date 0. Let of exiting entrepreneurs will re-enter after one quarter, while 8% will re-enter after one year. These calibration targets were chosen for two reasons. On the one hand, these targets imply that it is unlikely that exiting entrepreneurs will be able to re-enter within one year. This assumption can be justified by the observation that it would be difficult for an entrepreneur to quickly re-hire skilled labor or re-acquire the necessary physical capital if market conditions were to improve. Moreover, this is similar to standard models in which exit is typically modeled to be a permanent decision. On the other hand, as will be seen below, it generates the prediction that the entry probability e m (defined in Equation (12)) will be small. First, a low e m will ensure that the magnitude of fluctuations in entry rates is roughly consistent with the data. Second, it implies that it will be relatively difficult for entrepreneurs to turn an "idea" into a new business.
6 Of all potential entrants, only a small fraction each period will have an idea that is good enough to enter. 6 It is also perhaps consistent with evidence from the venture capital literature. For example, Sahlman (1990) notes that typical large venture capital firms only invest in about 1% of the proposals it receives each year. However, venture capital plays a small role in the entry decisions. In particular, Robb et al. (2010) reports that in the Kauffman firm survey, less than 1% of startups receive any funding from venture capitalists. Nevertheless, this does potentially illustrate the difficulty in turning an idea into a new business.
In the benchmark calibration, I assume that 0 = se ρ (see Section 3. 
Here, e m is the steady state fraction of potential entrants who enter (i.e., the entry probability defined in Equation (12) , potential re-entrants will make up a small fraction of total potential entrants.
Remaining Entry Parameters
As noted earlier, I set 0 = se ρ in the benchmark calibration. Essentially, the entry signal is assumed to be independent across periods. In this sense, the decision not to enter is a destructive one, as the potential entrant does not retain its signal for productivity. Nevertheless, in Section 4. 
Construction of the Technology Shock
Later in Section 4, I will feed into the model a sequence of technology shocks. I measure this shock by setting the sequence of } { t z so that the model-predicted fluctuations in output match those seen in the data. To be more precise, let 
This procedure is not trivial, as the equilibrium of the model needs to be solved repeatedly to back out t z . Figure 1 plots the resulting technology shock calculated using this procedure. Also plotted is the cyclical component of real GDP, which is constructed using the log-linear trend. The correlation of the technology shock with real GDP is very high (0.96).
Notes:
The technology shock (plotted on the left axis) is measured by setting the sequence of each shock so that the model-predicted fluctuations in output match those seen in the data. Seasonally-adjusted Real GDP (plotted on the right axis) is obtained from the BEA's National Income and Product Accounts. Real GDP is de-trended using a log-linear trend.
Figure 1. Constructed Technology Shock
Fitting this technology shock to the AR(1) process in Equation (1) . The mean z a is normalized to zero. While z ρ is similar to the typical value used in the literature, this shock is less volatile than technology shocks constructed using the Solow residual. In particular, the standard calibration follows Cooley and Prescott (1995) . However, because of the assumption of decreasing returns to scale, the Solow residual 8 is not equivalent to the technology shock in this model. In fact, the model-predicted Solow residual has a higher volatility than the input technology shock. Moreover, it is highly correlated with the residual from the data, and exhibits similar volatility.
Calibration of Remaining Parameters
The persistence of the idiosyncratic productivity shock was set to 850 . 0 = . 9 Therefore, the persistence assumed in this paper is close to the value assumed by Khan and Thomas (2013) and more persistent than in Clementi and Palazzo (2014) . Furthermore, the assumed value 2 1 / s s ε ρ σ -in this paper falls in between the values assumed by Khan and Thomas (2013) and Clementi and Palazzo (2014) . Nevertheless, in Section 4.4.2, I consider some alternative calibrations in which I let the persistence of idiosyncratic productivity be even higher. The results are unaffected. The Frisch elasticity of labor supply, ν , was set to 1.5. According to Keane and Rogerson (2012) , values commonly assumed in the literature range between 1 and 2. As for returns to scale in the model, I assumed that 6 . 0 = γ . This implies that the labor share will be 60%. Given the estimation procedure for the technology shock, these parameters are not particularly important. A higher labor supply elasticity or higher returns to scale will tend to make aggregate labor demand more elastic as well as making entry and exit rates more sensitive to aggregate shocks. However, in such a case, the estimated technology shock would be less volatile. And finally, since the model period is assumed to be a quarter, the risk-free rate r was chosen to be 1%. The labor disutility parameter, ψ , was set to normalize the equilibrium wage to 1 in the steady state.
RESULTS
The model is solved using dynamic programming techniques. Because the distribution of incumbents and entrants in the aggregate state x is a high-dimensional object, I apply the algorithm of Krusell and Smith (1998) . When applying this algorithm, one potential problem is that forecast errors may accumulate over time. Applying the suggested accuracy check in Den Haan (2010), I find that this does not occur. Appendix 9 Some caution is required when converting between annual and quarterly frequencies. Given the parameters for a productivity process at a quarterly frequency, ) , ( A goes into more specific detail on the numerical methods used and reports the results of several accuracy tests. First, in Section 4.1, I report the results of the benchmark calibration. Second, in Section 4.2, I conduct an experiment in which exiting entrepreneurs can re-enter quickly with a high probability. I will label this the "Quick Re-Entry" experiment. In Section 4.3, I examine the mechanism behind these results by considering further alternative calibrations. I will label these the "Slow Re-Entry" and "No Re-Entry" calibrations, respectively, and they will differ in the ability of entrepreneurs to re-enter. And finally, in Section 4.4, I perform some robustness checks.
Fit of Benchmark Calibration
As discussed in Section 3.2, I used the benchmark model to back out an historical sequence of technology shocks. Then, starting with the steady state distributions of entrepreneurs and potential entrants, I fed these shocks back into the model. This procedure generates predictions for entry and exit rates, which can be compared to the data. As for data on entry and exit, I utilize establishment birth and death rates from the BLS's Business Employment Dynamics (BED) survey. In the BED survey, an establishment death is defined to occur when an establishment reports zero employment in the third month of a quarter and does not report positive employment in the third month of the next four quarters. The establishment birth rate is defined analogously. This strict definition of entry and exit eliminates most temporary or seasonal entry and exit. The data for entry begin in 1993-II, while the data for exit begin in 1992-III. This time period covers two recessions: the 2001 recession and the 2007-09 recession. Because the technology shock begins in 1964-I and the entry/exit data do not begin until 1992-III, this means that the model was simulated for 114 quarters (or 28.5 years) until it could generate results on entry and exit that could be compared to the data.
The left two panels of Figure 2 plot the benchmark calibration's predictions for entry and exit rates against the data. Entry and exit rates, in the model and in the data, are both de-trended with a linear trend. As in the data, entry rates are predicted to be procyclical and exit rates are predicted to be countercyclical. Table 2 reports the raw correlations and standard deviations. The model does well accounting for the decrease in entry rates and the increase in exit rates which occurred during the 2007-09 recession. It also does well accounting for the increase in exit rates which occurred during the 2001 recession. However, the model does predict a decrease in exit rates during the 2001 recession, which did not occur. Nevertheless, under the benchmark calibration in which few exiting entrepreneurs are able to re-enter, the model does very well overall explaining both entry and exit rates.
Notes:
The left panels plot the model-generated entry and exit rates against the data, under the benchmark calibration. The right panels plot the model-generated output and hours against the data. Entry and exit rates 
Figure 2. Fit of Benchmark Calibration
Meanwhile, the right panels of Figure 2 plot the benchmark calibration's predictions for output and hours against the data. The data for output is quarterly seasonally adjusted real GDP from the BEA's National Income and Product Accounts. Hours is obtained as the quarterly average of aggregate weekly hours of production and non-supervisory employees from the BLS's Current Employment Statistics survey. A log-linear trend is used to de-trend both output and hours, in the model and the data. In Figure 2 , it can be seen that the model's predictions for output coincides with the data (by construction). The model's prediction for hours is highly correlated with the data, but less volatile. With only a technology shock in this paper, the model is better suited to explain fluctuations in output.
Moreover, the benchmark economy does well accounting for stylized facts that have not been targeted. Table 2 also reports the model's predictions for several of these statistics. In particular, in the steady state of the model, 66.6% of entrants survive after one year. According to the BLS's BED survey, 78.9% of private sector establishments survive after one year. In fact, for establishments born between 1994 and 2012, this survival rate has been stable around 79%. Furthermore, the benchmark calibration predicts that entrants will be smaller (in terms of employment) than incumbents, with entering producers on average 51.7% of the size of incumbents. According to the BED survey, the average relative size of entering establishments between 1994 and 2013 was 37.3%. However, since 1999, the relative size of entrants has been declining. In 1999, the relative size of entrants was about 45%, while by 2013 it had declined to 29%. Furthermore, in the steady state of the benchmark calibration, the productivity of entrants (relative to incumbents who operate) is 78.2%. Similarly, the productivity of exiting entrepreneurs (relative to incumbents who operate) is 67.8%. For manufacturing plants, Lee and Mukoyama (2015) report that entrants are 75% as productive as incumbent plants, while exiting plants are 64% as productive as incumbents. 
10
is the standard deviation of (HP-filtered) entry rates, exit rates, output and hours.
The data for the yearly survival rate of entrants and the relative size of entrants is obtained from the BLS's Business Employment Dynamics. The data for the relative productivity of entrants and exiting plants is obtained from Lee and Mukoyama (2015) .
Quick Re-Entry Calibration
At this stage, it is hopefully apparent that the benchmark calibration produces a 10 Lee and Mukoyama (2015) report the relative productivity of entering and exiting plants to be 75% and 64%, respectively, when productivity is measured without capital.
reasonable description of the economy, since it does well accounting for the dynamics of entry and exit. Moreover, the results of the benchmark model are similar to Macnamara (2014) , where it was assumed that exit is permanent. In contrast, exit is not permanent in this model, but it is still difficult for exiting entrepreneurs to re-enter in the future. Therefore, to evaluate the economic significance of "limited re-entry," I now calibrate the model so that a larger fraction of exiting entrepreneurs can re-enter quickly. I label this calibration the "Quick Re-Entry" calibration.
To be more precise, recall that pre is the probability an exiting entrepreneur will eventually re-enter in the steady state (see Equation (16) denote the average number of quarters it takes for an exiting entrepreneur to re-enter in the steady state, conditional on re-entry. Using Equations (15) and (16) , but increase re p to 60%. That is, for those entrepreneurs who eventually are able to re-enter, it still will take on average 2.2 quarters. However, a much larger fraction of exiting entrepreneurs will be able to re-enter. Using Equations (16) With these new calibration targets, I then feed into the model the same technology shock constructed with the benchmark economy. The left two panels of Figure 3 plot the results of this calibration for entry and exit rates. It is apparent that quick re-entry would have a significant effect on the dynamics of entry rates, but less of an effect on the dynamics of exit rates. First, as confirmed in Table 2 , entry rates would be significantly less volatile with quick re-entry. Second, after the 2007-09 recession, entry rates would have recovered much more quickly than was seen in the data. In fact, as seen in Table 2 , the quick re-entry model produces the counterfactual implication that entry rates would be countercyclical. This is because many of the entrepreneurs that exit during the crisis would immediately start re-entering, causing an increase in entry rates. This suggests that the procyclicality of entry rates is a consequence of limited re-entry.
Notes:
The left panels plot the model-generated entry and exit rates against the data, under the Quick Re-Entry experiment. The right panels plot the model-generated output and hours against the data. While quick re-entry certainly has large effects on the dynamics of entry, the important question is whether this would have broader effects on the economy as a whole. For this purpose, consider the right two panels of Figure 3 , which plots the Quick Re-Entry model's predictions for output and hours against the data. This shows that quick re-entry makes both output and hours less volatile, predictions which are confirmed in Table 2 . Furthermore, quick re-entry has significant implications for the recovery of output after the 2007-09 recession. Whereas in the data (and the benchmark calibration), output is about 9.5% below (the log-linear) trend in 2014-I, it would have only been 7% below trend in 2014-I with quick re-entry.
To see this result in another way, consider Figure 4 , which plots the predicted recovery in output after the 2007-09 recession with quick re-entry. First, it restricts attention to the time period after 2007-IV, which is identified by NBER as the peak of the 2007-09 recession. Second, the model's prediction for output is shown with the data's log-linear trend. Therefore, while it does ignore any level effects on output, it nevertheless illustrates more clearly the effect quick re-entry has on the recovery of output after the 2007-09 recession. In the data, real GDP grew at an annual rate of 2.2% between 2009-II and 2014-I. In contrast, the model predicts that real GDP would have grown at an annual rate of 2.7% over the same time period with quick re-entry. This difference of 0.5% in growth is significant. This suggests that limited re-entry has been a contributing factor to the slow recovery in output that followed the 2007-09 recession. 
Impulse Responses
To gain more intuition about these results, consider Figure 5 , which compares the impulse responses generated by the Quick Re-Entry experiment to those generated under the benchmark economy. Each impulse response is generated by a one standard deviation decrease in the innovation to aggregate productivity at date 0. First, consider the left two panels of Figure 5 , which plot the impulse responses for entry and exit rates. As seen before, quick re-entry has a large effect on the response of entry rates. While entry rates fall on impact, they increase above the steady state level only one quarter after the shock. In contrast, the dynamics of exit rates are similar under the two calibrations. However, with quick re-entry, exit rates take longer to return to normal.
Notes: These figures plot the evolution of several variables given a 1-standard deviation decrease in aggregate productivity at date 0. Impulse responses are generated for the benchmark calibration and Quick Re-Entry calibrations. Each variable is shown as the percentage deviation from its corresponding steady state value. Moreover, with quick re-entry, both entry and exit rates are less sensitive to technology shocks. To see why, note that elasticities for entry and exit rates can be derived for entry and exit rates as follows: there are two components which determine the quantitative impact of a technology shock. The first is the hazard rate, which reflects how many entrepreneurs are near the productivity cutoff relative to all entrepreneurs who enter or exit, respectively. The second component is the slope of the corresponding productivity cutoff, which reflects how much the cutoff responds to the aggregate shock. Table 4 reports the steady state hazard rates for entry and exit under each calibration. With quick re-entry, it turns out that the hazard rate for entry is smaller in the steady state. Nevertheless, the hazard rate for exit is very similar in the two calibrations. The reason for this is that e m is higher under Quick Re-Entry, but x m is still calibrated to the same value. With a higher entry probability, a change in the entry threshold has a smaller effect on the total number of entrants. Nevertheless, it turns out that both the entry and exit productivity cutoffs are less sensitive to technology shocks with quick re-entry. This can be seen in the middle panels of Figure 5 , which show the impulse responses for the entry and exit thresholds. The intuition behind this result can be seen from the entry and exit cutoff rules defined in Equations (4) and (5) . A decrease in technology tends to reduce the value of operating. Everything else being equal, this tends to increase the cutoff productivity for both entry and exit. However, a decrease in technology also lowers the value of waiting. Since the value of waiting is affected more with quick re-entry, this implies that the entry and exit cutoffs are less affected by the same technology shock in the Quick Re-Entry calibration.
Moreover, the different response of entry and exit rates has implications for the behavior of output and hours. The right two panels of Figure 5 plot the impulse responses for output and hours. It can be seen that both output and hours are less affected on impact under the Quick Re-Entry experiment. Moreover, because entry and exit are less affected by the technology shock, the number of entrepreneurs who operate is also less affected. As a consequence, both output and hours recover more quickly. This suggests that output would be less persistent with quick re-entry.
Furthermore, these results highlight the importance of limited re-entry for the amplification result in the literature. In particular, Clementi and Palazzo (2014) find that entry and exit further amplify and propagate the effects of aggregate shocks. Macnamara (2014) obtained a similar result in a model with both technology, labor and investment shocks. Devereux, Head, and Lapham (1996) , Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2012) , Jaimovich and Floetotto (2008) and Chatterjee and Cooper (2014) have found similar results in models with monopolistic competition. However, the quick re-entry experiment demonstrates that the magnitude of this effect is dependent on limited re-entry. With quick re-entry, not only would aggregate output be less volatile, but it would be quicker to recover in response to aggregate shocks. Therefore, when exit is more permanent, entry and exit tend to make aggregate output more volatile and more persistent.
Effect of Quick Re-Entry on Aggregate Productivity
Furthermore, quick re-entry has consequences for aggregate productivity. For example, Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001) find that entry and exit contribute to long-run productivity growth, as entrants tend to be more productive than the exiting plants they replace. While the long-run growth rate is zero in this model, this is the mechanism by which entry and exit will increase the level of aggregate productivity. To see this, consider Table 4 , which reports the average log productivity of entrants and exiting producers under the benchmark calibration and the Quick Re-Entry experiment. In both economies, entering producers are more productive than the exiting producers they replace. As a consequence, the average productivity of all producers (who operate) is above zero. Without entry and exit, the average productivity would have been zero, which is the mean of the invariant distribution for idiosyncratic productivity. Notes: "Avg. Log Productivity, All Operators" is the average log idiosyncratic productivity (in the steady state) of all producers who choose to operate. Corresponding averages are also reported for entrants (who operate) and exiting entrepreneurs (who do not operate). "Entry/Exit Cutoff Productivity" is the log of the steady state cutoff productivities for entry and exit, defined in Equations (4) in these calibrations, the exit cutoff productivity is equal to the entry cutoff productivity. The entry (exit) hazard rate is the steady state measure of entering (exiting) entrepreneurs at the entry (exit) cutoff productivity, divided by the mass of entrepreneurs who enter (exit).
In fact, the productivity advantage of entrants over exiting producers is larger under the Quick Re-Entry experiment. As a consequence, the average productivity of all producers (who operate) is higher under the Quick Re-Entry experiment. This is because the cutoff productivity for entry and exit is higher with quick re-entry. The intuition behind this result can be seen from the entry and exit cutoff rules defined in Equations (4) and (5) . The ability to re-enter quickly under the Quick Re-Entry experiment tends to increase the value of waiting. As a consequence, marginal entrepreneurs, who would have operated in the benchmark calibration, will choose to exit and wait under the Quick Re-Entry calibration. The same is true for potential entrants. This tends to raise the productivity of all entrepreneurs who operate. Therefore, while models along the lines of Hopenhayn (1992) predict that the selection introduced by entry and exit will raise aggregate productivity, these results indicate that this selection effect is hampered by limited re-entry.
Further Alternative Calibrations
To further clarify the mechanism behind these results, I compare the benchmark calibration to an additional two calibrations. In the first alternative calibration, I assume 1
, implying that exiting entrepreneurs cannot re-enter and potential entrants cannot delay entry. I label this the "No Re-Entry" calibration. To be consistent with the benchmark calibration, I maintain the original target for e m , which was 6.9%. In the second calibration, I allow re-entry, but assume that it takes much longer for exiting entrepreneurs to re-enter. Consequently, I label this the "Slow Re-Entry" calibration. All other calibration targets remain the same. . In other words, 60% of exiting entrepreneurs eventually re-enter in the steady state. For those entrepreneurs who did re-enter, re-entry took on average 2.2 quarters (the same as in the benchmark economy). Therefore, in the Slow Re-Entry calibration, I maintain the assumption that % 60 = re p , but now assume that 12 = re t quarters (or three years). In other words, exiting entrepreneurs are just as likely to re-enter as in the Quick Re-Entry calibration, but it will take about six times as long. Using Equations (16) and (17), this requires that Next, for each of the two alternative calibrations, I feed into the model the technology shock measured using the benchmark economy. It turns out that the dynamics of both entry and exit are very similar to the benchmark calibration under both the No Re-Entry and Slow Re-Entry calibrations. The same is true for output and hours. Although 60% of exiting entrepreneurs are eventually able to re-enter in the steady state of the Slow Re-Entry calibration, only 5% re-enter in the first quarter after exit. In the benchmark calibration, the corresponding number was 4%. In contrast, 27.4% of exiting entrepreneurs re-enter in the first quarter after exit under the Quick Re-Entry calibration. Therefore, in the Slow Re-Entry calibration, re-entry is still limited as in the benchmark calibration. That is, few entrepreneurs actually re-enter shortly after exit and, as a consequence, re-entry has a small effect on the dynamics of entry.
To understand this further, it is useful to decompose fluctuations in entry rates as follows:
This uses the definition of the entry rate in Equation (11). To express each variable in terms of the percentage deviation from its steady state value, I indicate this using a circumflex (e.g., e m is the percent deviation of e m from its steady state value). Therefore, fluctuations in the entry rate can be decomposed into fluctuations in the mass of entrants ( e M ) minus fluctuations in the mass of incumbent entrepreneurs ( M ). Using
Equation ( For each calibration, Figure 6 plots the impulse responses for the individual components of e m in Equation (18). Each impulse response is generated by a unit standard deviation decrease in technology at date 0. The top-left panel of Figure 6 plots the impulse response for the mass of potential entrants and the bottom-left panel shows the entry probability. The top-right panel shows the mass of entrants, which is just the sum of the left two panels. The bottom-right panel shows fluctuations in the mass of incumbents. Consequently, the percentage change in the entry rate is just the top-right panel minus the bottom-right panel.
First, consider the benchmark, Slow Re-Entry and No Re-Entry calibrations. From Figure 6 it can be seen that the model's predictions are very similar for these economies. The only exception to this is the model's predictions for fluctuations in the mass of potential entrants. In the No Re-Entry calibration, the mass of potential entrants is constant by assumption. In the benchmark calibration, the mass of potential entrants is still very stable, but does tend to rise during periods of low aggregate productivity. However, in the Slow Re-Entry calibration, the mass of potential entrants is much more volatile. However, despite the fact that Not surprisingly, the starkest differences can be seen in the predictions of the Quick Re-Entry calibration. The mass of potential entrants is most volatile in this calibration. A decrease in technology leads to an increase in exit rates, which causes a large increase in the mass of potential entrants with quick re-entry. However, since the entry threshold is less sensitive to technology shocks, the entry probability is less affected by the negative technology shock. As a consequence, the mass of entrants is much less affected, which dampens the effect of the technology shock on the mass of incumbent producers.
The similarity of the benchmark and No Re-Entry calibrations suggests that models can safely abstract from re-entry. While not shown, the benchmark and No Re-Entry calibrations are also very similar to one in which re-entry is disabled, but not delayed entry. Nevertheless, the quick re-entry experiment highlights the economic consequences of limited re-entry (or permanent exit), which have not been explored in the literature. . This meant that an exiting entrepreneur's idiosyncratic productivity had no relevance for its entry signal. The skills or intellectual capital encompassed by the producer are essentially lost by the decision to exit. Similarly, a potential entrant's signal today had no relevance for its signal tomorrow. The skills of a potential entrant are assumed to be lost by the decision not to enter. However, one advantage of this assumption was that it made it possible to derive closed form expressions for re p and re t . To evaluate whether this has affected the results, I now relax this assumption.
Robustness Checks
Specifically I then repeat the same exercise as in Sections 4.1 and 4.2. Specifically, I used the model with persistent signals to back out a historical sequence of technology shocks. It turns out that the sequence of technology shocks calculated using the calibration with persistent signals is very similar to those obtained under the benchmark calibration. Then, as before, I feed in this sequence of technology shocks back into the model with persistent signals. It turns out that the model's predictions for entry, exit rates, output and hours are unchanged. In fact, the differences are negligible.
Next, I repeat the Quick Re-Entry experiment with persistent signals. Figure 7 plots the resulting dynamics of entry and exit rates against the data. Also plotted are the dynamics of entry and exit rates under the original Quick Re-Entry experiment. With persistent signals, entry and exit are more volatile. Focusing in particular on 2007-09 recession, entry rates recover even faster with persistent signals. Exit rates increase even more with persistent signals, as now exit is less destructive to the entrepreneur. The effect on the dynamics of output and hours (not shown) are similar as before. However, with persistent signals, model predicts that the average growth rate of real GDP between 2009-II and 2014-I would have been 2.8%, instead of 2.7%. Therefore, the assumption of 0 = se ρ in the benchmark calibration has no effect on the core results. 
Process for Idiosyncratic Productivity

CONCLUSIONS
By building a model of firm dynamics, this paper studies the consequences of "limited re-entry" for macroeconomic dynamics. While it has been typically assumed in the literature that exit is permanent, the economic significance of limited re-entry or permanent exit have not been explored before. The model, reasonably calibrated, indicates that limited re-entry has increased the volatility of output and slowed the recovery in output following the 2007-09 recession. Moreover, while entry and exit tend to raise aggregate productivity in models derived from Hopenhayn (1992) , these results demonstrate that aggregate productivity would be even higher if quick re-entry was possible. With permanent exit, many low-productivity entrepreneurs choose to operate because they do not have the option to re-enter later.
While the data in this paper refers to the entry and exit of establishments, the analysis can be extended to the entry and exit of firms, the creation or discontinuation of product lines, or a company's entry into or exit from markets. Nevertheless, this paper suggests that limited re-entry of any form has significant effects on the aggregate economy. The model, however, does not take a stand as to why re-entry is difficult. One reason is likely that it would be difficult for entrepreneurs to re-hire skilled labor or re-acquire the necessary physical capital if market conditions were to improve. Nevertheless, it does suggest that policies which make re-entry easier could raise aggregate productivity and reduce the volatility of output.
APPENDIX
A. COMPUTATIONAL METHOD The entrepreneur's value functions are approximated by value function iteration. The aggregate state x includes μ and g, both of which are high-dimensional objects. Therefore, I applied the algorithm of Krusell and Smith (1998) The parameter c depends on ψ , which determines the household's disutility from working. Therefore, I set ψ to guarantee that the wage is 1 in the steady state. Using Γ instead of Γ turns out to be a reasonable approximation. After simulating the benchmark model for 10,500 periods and dropping the first 500 observations, the maximum wage error (in absolute value) from this approximation was 0.21%. In the Quick Re-Entry model, the maximum wage error was even lower (0.06%). Furthermore, since agents need to know tomorrow's Γ to determine wages in the future, I suppose that Γ obeys the following law of motion: In Appendix A.4, I discuss the accuracy of this forecasting rule. Then, to solve the model, the following algorithm is used. However, as demonstrated by Den Haan (2010), these tests are awed. Therefore, following Den Haan (2010), I assess the accuracy of the forecasting rule by calculating the maximum error between the actual Γ and the forecasted Γ generated by the rule without updating. More specifically, I first construct an artificial sequence of technology
